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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           __________ 
 
                          No. 01-2361 
                           __________ 
                                 
                       SANTOS VALLADOLID, 
                                              Appellant 
                                 
                                  v. 
                                 
                COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
                           __________ 
                                 
        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
                   D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-05919 
  District Judge:  The Honorable John W. Bissell, Chief Judge 
                           __________ 
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                       February 12, 2002 
                           __________ 
                                 
       Before: MANSMANN, McKEE, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
                                 
              (Opinion Filed: February 19, 2002 ) 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                                 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
     On October 25, 2000, appellant filed a motion for attorneys' fees  
pursuant to the 
Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C.  2412(d)(1)(A), for 
counsel's work in 
appealing the Commissioner's denial of appellant's claim for disability 
benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income.  On April 23, 2001, the District Court 
denied that motion.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291 and will affirm. 
     The parties are familiar with the facts underlying this appeal and we 
will, 
accordingly, discuss them only as necessary to resolve the issue 
presented. 
     This case began more than ten years ago when appellant filed a 
disability claim for 
alleged mental impairment due to depression.  Appellant lost before the 
ALJ, lost before 
the Appeals Council, lost before District Court, and ultimately lost 
before us on August 
16, 2000.  In sum, the District Court determined that substantial evidence 
supported the 
ALJ's finding that appellant was not disabled, and we summarily affirmed.   
     Just before we affirmed, however, the Commissioner agreed to a remand 
for 
further administrative proceedings, an agreement of which we were apprised 
after our 
order issued.  Accordingly, we entered an order vacating our August 16, 
2000 order and 
remanding the case to the District Court, which, in turn, remanded the 
matter to the 
Commissioner.  On remand, new evidence in the form of vocational expert 
testimony was 
submitted and appellant prevailed on the merits.  Appellant now seeks 
$8,646.55 in 
attorneys' fees "for work performed before the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit."  Appellant's Br. at 10. 
     The EAJA provides, in pertinent part, that a prevailing party shall 
be awarded 
"fees and other expenses . . . , unless the court finds that the position 
of the United States 
was substantially justified."  28 U.S.C.  2412(d)(1)(A).  The District 
Court denied 
appellant's motion for fees particularly in light of the fact that both 
that Court and our 
Court had found that the Commissioner's position was supported by 
substantial evidence.  
App. 19-21.  We review this determination for an abuse of discretion.  
E.g., Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988); Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682 
(3d Cir. 
1998). 
     A position is "substantially justified" when it is "justified in 
substance or in the 
main that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable 
person."  Pierce, 487 
U.S. at 565.  In other words, the government's position is substantially 
justified "if it has 
a reasonable basis in both law and fact."  Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684 
(quoting Hanover 
Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
     Within this framework, it is well settled that the government may 
lose on the 
merits yet still be found to have been substantially justified in its 
position.  Similarly, if 
the case turns on an unsettled or "close" question of law, the 
government's position will 
normally be substantially justified notwithstanding the fact that its 
legal position is 
ultimately rejected.  Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 961-62 (3d Cir. 
1985).  In 
contrast, "[w]hen the government's legal position clearly offends 
established precedent . . 
. its position cannot be said to be 'substantially justified.'"  Id. at 
962. 
     The Commissioner bears the burden of showing that his position was 
substantially 
justified.  Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684.  To carry this burden, the 
Commissioner must show: 
(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable 
basis in law for the 
theory  he propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts 
alleged and the 
legal theory advanced.  Id. 
     Here, the Commissioner's position was that appellant was not disabled 
and that the 
ALJ's denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence.  In short, 
the ALJ 
concluded that appellant had the residual functional capacity to perform 
work existing in 
significant numbers in the national economy, and that no mental impairment 
existed that 
would preclude such work.  App. 31-32 & 41.  In addressing two medical 
opinions 
suggesting that severe depression existed, the ALJ observed that the 
reports failed to find 
any specific or significant work-related limitations, were based on 
appellant's subjective 
complaints rather than objective findings, and revealed that appellant 
showed signs of 
"malingering."  App. 32-33.  In addition, the ALJ found appellant's 
subjective complaints 
not to be credible, and relied on test results showing that appellant had 
normal 
concentration and memory abilities as evidence contradicting at least one 
of the medical 
reports.  App. 34.  The Appeals Council concurred. 
     Before the District Court, the Commissioner contended that the ALJ's 
findings 
regarding the issue of mental impairment were supported by substantial 
evidence.  As the 
Court put it: "The dispute between claimant and the Commissioner arises in 
step two [of 
the five-step sequence in evaluating disability claims].  The Commissioner 
maintains that, 
despite the two opinions concluding that claimant's depression is severe, 
it is not."  App. 
38.  The District Court, in a thorough opinion, agreed, primarily because 
the doctors who 
offered those opinions failed to adduce objective evidence supporting 
them, which left 
appellant with insufficient proof at step two of the five-step sequence.  
App. 41-49.  We 
affirmed "substantially for the reasons" set forth by the District Court.  
Valladolid v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, No. 00-5097, at 2 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 
2000). 
     With this record in mind, we turn to the Commissioner's burden of 
establishing a 
substantially justified position. First, the facts upon which the position 
rested -- the 
statements contained in the doctors' reports, medical test results, and 
the ALJ's credibility 
determinations -- had a reasonable basis in truth.  Second, the lack of 
objective findings in 
the doctors' reports and the ALJ's credibility determinations gave the 
Commissioner a 
reasonable basis in law to argue that appellant failed to carry his burden 
and that the 
ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.  That we 
ultimately affirmed 
lends support to the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual and 
legal conclusions 
and the connection of one to the other.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that the Commissioner carried his 
burden of 
demonstrating a substantially justified position. 
     In his attempt to rebut this conclusion, appellant invokes a litany 
of wholly 
speculative contentions as to the reasons for the Commissioner's agreement 
to remand, 
the "delay" in notifying us of that decision, and an alleged "informal 
agreement" by or 
practice of the Commissioner not to challenge fee applications after such 
remands.  He 
argues, as well, that the Commissioner erroneously construed the evidence 
in rejecting his 
claim, as evidenced by his ultimate success on the merits.  Finally, he 
argues that the 
Commissioner's position "clearly offended" established and forthcoming 
precedent, and 
that the District Court and this Court "ignored" this precedent.  Only 
this final argument 
warrants discussion. 
     Remarkably, appellant exerts a fair amount of energy contending that 
we ignored 
Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000), when we rejected his claim on 
the merits in 
our August 16, 2000 order.  We say "remarkably" because Sykes was decided 
more than 
a month after we disposed of appellant's claim on the merits.  Appellant 
acknowledges 
this fact, yet insists that we ignored Sykes.  It goes without saying that 
we could hardly 
have ignored a decision that did not exist and appellant has not pointed 
to anything that 
would have enabled us, the District Court, or (most importantly) the 
Commissioner to 
foresee our future holdings.  In any event, appellant's reliance on Sykes 
is entirely 
unpersuasive. 
     Appellant next claims that the District Court and our Court also 
ignored our prior 
decisions in Jesurum v. Secretary of the United States Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., 
48 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 1995); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43 (3d Cir. 1994); 
and Gilliland v. 
Heckler, 786 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1986).  Appellant's Br. at 17.  
Specifically, appellant 
opines that he "argued before the District Court and before this Court 
that the ALJ would 
not be permitted under Jesurum . . . to utilize the 'framework' of a 
vocational rule in the 
presence of non-exertional limitations," but that this argument 
"ultimately fell on deaf 
ears."  Appellant's Br. at 17-18 (emphasis added).  This argument fails 
for a number of 
reasons. 
     First, none of the above cases compel an ALJ to use a vocational 
expert where the 
claimant has both exertional and nonexertional impairments, nor do they 
categorically 
preclude the ALJ from utilizing the vocational rules in such cases. 
Indeed, we observed 
in Sykes that "[w]e have never defined what sort of evidence the 
Commissioner must 
present to meet his burden of proof" in such circumstances.  Sykes, 228 
F.3d at 273.  
Second, appellant's cases are factually inapposite because each of the 
cases involved 
insufficiently developed factual records or factual findings illustrating 
what work the 
claimant could perform in light of uncontradicted medical evidence that 
conflicted with 
the ALJ's findings.   Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 118-20; Adorno, 40 F.3d at 46-
47; Gilliland, 
786 F.2d at 183-84.  Here, in contrast, the ALJ made specific and 
supported factual 
findings regarding appellant's ability to perform work, App. 31, and his 
finding of no 
severe mental impairment was supported by the medical evidence. 
     Finally, even viewing these cases in the light most favorable to 
appellant, the 
Commissioner's position can, at worst, be described as a good faith 
argument on an 
unresolved or "close" legal question.  As such, the Commissioner's 
position was 
substantially justified.  Washington, 756 F.2d at 961-62. 
     We have carefully considered all of appellant's remaining contentions 
and find 
them to be unavailing. 
     We will affirm the April 23, 2001 order of the District Court. 
 TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Kindly file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
                                  /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry   
                                   Circuit Judge 
 
